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ABSTRACT

Hedge funds are one of the fastest growing and most controversial segments
of the financial market. Most people know very little about hedge funds other than
that they are the investment vehicle of choice for well-heeled investors – the place
where the rich put their money in order to get even richer.
In fact, hedge funds thrive on the lack of knowledge about what exactly it is
that they do. Without the ability to keep their trading strategies confidential, hedge
funds argue they would not be able generate the impressive returns that keep them
in business.
And so when the Securities and Exchange Commission, (“SEC” or
“Commission”), implemented a rule requiring most hedge fund operators to
register their names and open their books for inspection, it is no wonder that it
triggered cries of outrage in the industry. Many hedge fund managers threatened
to simply move their operations offshore (though it is not clear how many were
actually prepared to follow through on that threat). Others took the battle to court.
The result of one of those legal battles, Goldstein v. SEC was a decision in
June 2006 by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in which the
court ordered the SEC to scrap the new rule. The decision effectively allowed
hedge funds to maintain the anonymity they desired. That decision and the
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developments in the law that led to it, are the subject of this paper.
While the decision represents an important victory for hedge funds, the
debate about whether hedge funds should be more closely regulated continues in
Congress and the popular media. This article outlines recommendations for what
the SEC or politicians should do in regard to hedge fund regulation.
These recommendations can best be summarized as “do nothing.” However,
if courts were inclined to make such recommendations, it would likely be one the
Goldstein court would agree with. Although not central to the decision, it is clear
that the SEC failed to convince the court that there was much of a compelling
reason for the new rule on hedge funds because none of the dangers that the SEC
warned about actually materialized.
Following a brief introduction to the relevant securities laws, this paper
examines the development of the specific law at issue in Goldstein. It then
examines the arguments that each side made and analyzes the outcome. The paper
concludes with recommendations that I believe stem directly from the court’s
finding and the logic that underlies it.
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INTRODUCTION

By any measure, hedge funds have become some of Wall Street’s biggest
players. Hedge funds now control some $1.4 trillion in assets, up from $240
1
billion in 1998, when the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management
(“LTCM”) threatened the global financial system and first raised serious concerns
about the lack of oversight of hedge funds. Today, hedge funds are behind more
2
than one in every four stock trades and they are wielding increasing and often
3
over-sized influence on public companies.

Graph 1: Growth in Hedge Funds
Despite this tremendous growth in size and market influence, hedge funds
have been largely unregulated by the SEC, the nation’s market watchdog. And
now a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit promises
1
Shivani Vora and Mark Gongloff, Hedge-Fund Milestones, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2007, at A14.
The $1.4 trillion in assets controlled by hedge funds represents 5% of all assets under management in
the United States. Id.
2
Id.
3
See Kara Scanell, Outside Influence: How Borrowed Shares Swing Company Votes, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 26, 2007, at A1.
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to extend this immunity from regulatory oversight.
In Goldstein v. SEC, the court held that the SEC’s so-called Hedge Fund
Rule, which would have given the SEC greater oversight over hedge funds, was
invalid because it was arbitrary and in conflict with the purpose of the underlying
4
statute in which the new rule was included. The decision seems to shut the door
on any SEC-led move to strengthen oversight of hedge funds and effectively leaves
it to Congress to decide if increased oversight of hedge funds is needed.
At the heart of the decision was the court’s interpretation of the definition of
5
“client” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Before 2006, the SEC did
6
not consider investors in hedge funds to be clients of hedge fund advisers. Rather,
7
only the funds they managed were considered clients of the adviser. Because the
Investment Advisers Act says that advisers who have fewer than fifteen clients do
not have to register with the SEC, this earlier interpretation of “client” meant most
8
hedge fund advisers did not have to register with the SEC. The Hedge Fund Rule,
would have effectively eliminated this exemption for most hedge fund advisers by
including fund investors in the definition of clients for purposes of the registration
9
requirement.
This change would have resulted in sweeping changes in the industry.
Before the SEC implemented the new regulation last year, the only hedge fund
advisers who registered with the SEC were the relatively small number of hedge
fund advisers who had fifteen or more client funds, those who advised a registered
10
company and/or those who registered voluntarily.
Registration would have
required more disclosure of financial information and subjected hedge funds to
11
inspections by the SEC. Overall, the SEC estimates that fewer than half of hedge
12
fund advisers were registered before the hedge fund rule was implemented.
To reach its conclusion that hedge fund investors are not clients of fund
advisers for the purpose of the IAA’s registration requirement, the Goldstein court
13
drew heavily from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lowe v. SEC, which held that
while hedge fund advisers owe a direct fiduciary duty to their funds, this fiduciary
14
duty does not extend to the people who invest in those funds.

4

Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Id. 15 U.S.C. §80 (2006).
6
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876.
7
Id.
8
Id. Also see, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006), which exempts
from the registration requirement “any investment adviser who during the course of the preceding
twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither holds himself out generally to the
public as an investment adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company registered
under subchapter I of this Chapter ...”
9
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877.
10
Staff Report To The United States Securities And Exchange Commission, Implications Of The
Growth Of Hedge Funds, (Sept. 2003), at 22, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter Staff Report].
11
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874.
12
Staff Report, supra note 10, at 22.
13
Lowe v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 42 U.S. 181 (1985).
14
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880.
5
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A. Background: the Development of Hedge Funds and Relevant Securities’
Laws
Before looking more closely at how the court reached this conclusion, it is
useful to place the dispute in a historical context by briefly examining the
development of hedge-fund regulations.
In 1940, Congress enacted two comprehensive acts to regulate markets: the
Investment Company Act (“ICA”) regulated securities firms and the kinds of
products they could offer, while the Investment Advisers Act (“IAA”) was a kind
15
of rulebook for people who offered investment advice professionally. The acts
aimed to protect investors by regulating any conflicts of interest between securities
companies and investment advisers, on the one hand, and the investing public on
16
the other.
17
The ICA required companies selling securities to register with the SEC,
imposed certain disclosure requirements on firms and laid out restrictions on the
18
kind of securities they could issue. The ICA directs the commission to regulate
any issuer of securities that “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily . . .
19
in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.”
From the beginning, the ICA intentionally left out small investment
companies. Specifically, the law, and its attendant registration and disclosure
requirements, expressly did not apply to companies that did not offer securities to
20
the public and had a hundred or fewer owners and investors. Most hedge funds
are exempt from the ICA’s coverage either because of this exception or because
they accepted investments only from so-called “qualified” or high net-worth
21
investors. Congress, thus, explicitly and intentionally created a way for hedge
funds, even if they were not then called that, to fly under the radar of federal
regulation. And within a decade after the act went into effect, hedge-fund like
companies took advantage of this provision and began offering investments free
22
from regulation.
The IAA, on the other hand, prohibits investment advisers from engaging in
23
fraudulent or deceptive business practices. The SEC required advisers to register
under the act, so that it can respond quickly to any complaints about deceptive

15
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C §80a (1940). Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §80b (1940).
16
15 U.S.C §80a (1940). 15 U.S.C. §80b (1940).
17
15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (2006).
18
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-14, 80a-18, 80a-22, 80a-23 (2006).
19
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(a)(1)(A) (2006).
20
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006).
21
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2006).
22
Staff Report, supra note 10, at 5.
23
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006).
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24

practices.
The IAA defines hedge fund advisers as a person who “for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
25
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities . . . .”
However, most hedge fund managers will also qualify for an exemption from
registration under a section of this Act which exempts “any investment adviser
who during the course of the preceding twelve months has had fewer than fifteen
clients and who neither holds himself out generally to the public as an investment
adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company registered
26
under [the Investment Company Act].”
The SEC had interpreted “client” as
27
referring to the partnership or fund-entity itself.
And so most hedge fund
managers were exempt because even the largest of them normally managed fewer
28
than fifteen funds.
In summary, the result of all these exceptions to the Investment Companies
Act and the Investment Advisers Act is that hedge fund advisers normally don’t
have to register with the commission and thus are not required to disclose their
29
financial conditions or investment positions. Hedge funds are also free from the
kinds of restrictions on investment activities placed on mutual funds and other
companies that are required to register. For example, unlike registered companies,
hedge funds face no restrictions on trading on margin, entering into short sales or
30
investing in commodities and real estate.
The SEC estimated that less than half of hedge fund advisers, or some 2,500,
were registered with the Commission as of June 2006 and that about half of those
31
registered only after the Commission enacted its Hedge Fund Rule.
The landscape for hedge funds remained largely unchanged until 1992 when
the SEC’s Division of Investment Management recommended expanding the
private-investment-company exception to the ICA. Recognizing the important role
that these investment companies played in raising capital for small business, the
SEC recommended that Congress revise the ICA to allow even more companies to
operate free from regulation by creating another exception for investment funds
held exclusively by so-called “qualified purchasers” or those wealthy investors
who, because of their wealth and subsequent financial sophistication, did not need
32
the ICA’s protections. The revision effectively eliminated the one-hundred-or-

24

15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006). See also Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 869-71 (2d
Cir. 1977) (holding that the general partners of a hedge fund are considered “investment advisers,”
though the ruling is somewhat ambiguous as to who (or what entities) are considered the clients of the
general partner/investment adviser).
26
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006).
27
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876.
28
Id..
29
15 U.S.C. 80-a-8, 80a-29 (2006).
30
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12(a)(1), (3) and 80a-13(a)(2) (2006).
31
Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning the Regulation
of Hedge Funds Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (July 25,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts072506cc.htm.
32
Opening Br. of Pet’rs Phillip Goldstein, Kimball & Winthrop, Inc., and
25
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fewer-investors-limitation and created an environment for larger, unregulated
hedge funds.
Where the ICA cleared a wide path for hedge fund companies to operate
largely unfettered by regulation, the IAA, as we have seen, created similar
exceptions for investment advisers, including those who ran hedge funds. The
IAA defines investment advisers as persons who “for compensation, engages in the
business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or
33
selling securities.”
Although the IAA stipulates that most investment advisers
must register with the SEC, the statute carved out an exception from the
registration requirement for “any investment adviser who during the course of the
preceding twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who [does not]
34
hold himself out generally to the public as an investment adviser.” Those who
qualify for the exemption do not have to maintain detailed transaction records,
which they must periodically provide to SEC inspectors, or retain a compliance
35
officer.
This does not mean, however, that advisers who are exempt from the
registration requirement are completely free from any regulatory oversight. The
IAA prohibits any investment adviser from engaging in fraud and applies equally
36
to advisers who are required to register and those who are not.
Courts have
interpreted this provision of the act to do more than just prohibit fraud. The
Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. ruled that the anti37
fraud provision establishes a fiduciary duty between advisers and their clients.
This fiduciary duty, requires that advisers have a reasonable basis for their
38
investment advice and disclose any conflicts of interest to their clients.
The Commission helped clarify the extent of this liability for at least one
class of advisers in 1985 with the adoption of its so-called “safe harbor” rule for
39
general partners in an investment partnership. The rule says that only the limited
partnership itself, i.e. the legal entity, is counted as a client of a general partner
who provides investment advice based on the investment objectives of the
40
partnership. Notably under this rule, the investors in a limited partnership are not
considered clients of the general partner and so the general partner’s fiduciary duty
41
does not extend to them.
Like the creation of an exemption for funds that catered to qualified
purchasers under the Investment Companies Act, this change to the Investment

Opportunity Partners L.P. at 14-15, Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04-1434).
33
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006).
34
15 U.S.C.§80b-3(b)(3) (2006).
35
15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2006).
36
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006).
37
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963).
38
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Adopting Release].
39
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880.
40
Id.
41
Id.

118

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. I:1

Advisers Act also created greater opportunity for hedge funds to operate with
42
minimal regulatory oversight.
B. The Move to Strengthen Oversight of Hedge Funds
However, it was not long after these revisions were enacted that the tide
seemed to turn against hedge funds as regulators and the broader financial
community began to call for tougher oversight. The single event most responsible
for this shift was probably the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in
1998.
The fund was founded just four years earlier by the former head of bond
trading at Salomon Brothers who put together an impressive team of financial
gurus. Following a series of misplaced and highly-leveraged bets, the fund faced a
43
life threatening credit crunch.
Widespread concerns that the fund’s sudden
collapse might threaten the stability of the global financial system prompted the
Federal Reserve to orchestrate an emergency $3.6 billion bailout by a consortium
44
of Wall Street firms including Goldman Sachs & Co.
Just how much of a threat to financial markets a collapse would have been
was the subject of some debate. Nonetheless, the incident prompted creation of a
series of high-level study groups to consider what could be done to insure that a
45
small group of investors would not be able to easily upset global markets.
The result was calls for greater scrutiny of secretive hedge funds, and a series
of discussions of regulatory changes culminating in the SEC’s issuance of its
46
Hedge Fund Rule.
The SEC proposed the rule in July 2004 to address a lack of basic
47
information about hedge fund advisers and the hedge fund industry. The rule
48
imposed the registration requirement on virtually all hedge fund advisers. It
accomplished this by requiring advisers to a private fund to count shareholders in
that fund as clients, for the purposes of determining whether the adviser qualifies
49
for the registration exemption. That is, instead of counting only the fund itself as
50
a client, advisers had to count anyone who had a stake in the fund. Because most
hedge funds have more than fifteen investors, the result was that the vast majority
42

17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2) (2007).
Vora and Gongloff, supra note 1.
44
Id.; Jacob M. Schlesinger and Michael Schroeder, Greenspan Defends Long-Term Capital Plan:
More Threats Lurk in Market, Fed Chairman Testifies; Lawmakers are Critical, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2,
1998, at A3.
45
Adopting Release, supra note 38, at 72,058
46
Id.
47
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, 45,177 [hereinafter Proposing Release] (July 28, 2004).
48
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877.
49
Id. at 45,183. Specifically, the new rule said that for purposes of the Investment Advisers Act
“you must count as clients the shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries ... of the fund.”
Adopting Release, supra note 38, at 72,088.
50
This is a so-called “look-through provision” designed to allow the commission to look through
the legal edifice to investors in order to establish regulatory oversight. See Adopting Release, supra
note 38, at 72,073, 72,075.
43
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of hedge fund advisers no longer qualified for the registration exemption.
Under the new rule, private funds were explicitly defined as investment
companies that are exempt from regulation under the “fewer-than-100shareholders” or the “qualified-purchasers” exemption—the precise exemptions
52
under which most unregulated hedge funds were operating.
The SEC said the rule was necessary because of three recent changes in the
hedge fund industry: first, the rapid growth of the industry over the previous
decade; second, an increase in fraud by hedge funds; and third, a broadening of the
53
types of investors who were investing in hedge funds.
The rule went into effect on February 10, 2005 and advisers who were
required to register because of the change must have done so by February 1,
54
2006.
Of course, the new rule was not popular among hedge funds, which were
required to add compliance officers and divulge more information about their
55
funds.
C. The Dissent to the Hedge Fund Rule
56

The rule also did not have universal support even within the SEC. Notably,
57
two of the five commissioners dissented to the rule. The dissenters said the new
rule marked a departure from the Commission’s established approach of
determining whether a client relationship exists by examining whether or not an
58
adviser tailored his investment advice to the objectives of the individual investor.
The argument of the dissenters, was very similar to the argument that
Goldstein used to challenge the new rule. The two Commissioners who opposed
the new rule wrote a detailed and sharply-worded dissent in which they began by
pointing out that the new regulation was adopted amid strong opposition from a
59
large and diverse group of financial-system professionals and observers.
The dissenters cited a litany of reasons why they believed the rule was illadvised. Broadly speaking, their complaints fell into three categories: (1) that
there were alternative ways to get information about hedge fund advisers short of
60
imposing a mandatory registration requirement, (2) that the SEC’s stated reasons

51
Sue Ann Mota, Hedge Funds: Their Advisers Do Not Have to Register with the SEC, But More
Information and Other Alternatives Are Recommended, 67 LA. L. REV 55, 56 (2006).
52
Proposing Release, supra note 47, at 45,184 n.138.
53
Id. at 45,174-75,178.
54
Adopting Release, supra note 38 at 72,054.
55
Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy,
Style, and Mission, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 975, 988-89 (2006).
56
Adopting Release, supra note 38, at 72,089.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 72,097 n.94.
59
Adopting Release, supra note 38, at 72,089 (citing newspaper editorials opposing the new rule in
the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post). See Hands off Hedge Funds, WASH.
POST, at B6, July 18, 2004; Reforming Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, at D12, June 27, 2004; The SEC's
Expanding Empire, WALL ST. J., at A14, July 13, 2004.
60
Adopting Release, supra note 38, at 72,089.
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for the rule, retailization of hedge funds and rampant fraud, were a pretext because
61
there was no indication that either was actually occurring and finally, (3) that the
SEC’s already limited resources will be further stretched to conduct examinations
62
of hedge funds.
In regard to the first point, the dissenters argued that “the needed information
about hedge funds can be obtained from other sources, including other regulators
and market participants, as well as through a notice and filing requirement. The
Commission should have collected and analyzed the existing information and
determined what new information would be useful before imposing mandatory
63
registration.”
The most critical language of the dissent was used when they argued that the
64
SEC’s rationale for the new rule did not withstand scrutiny. According to the
dissenters, the Commission’s staff
. . . found that fraud was not rampant in the hedge fund industry, and that
retailization was not a concern. Nonetheless, the majority repeatedly asserts that
these issues justify imposition of the rulemaking. The fallacy of the majority’s
approach is apparent when one notes that registration of hedge fund advisers would
not have prevented the enforcement cases cited by the majority, and the rulemaking
65
will have the perverse effect of promoting, rather than inhibiting, retailization.

As for diverting the resources of the SEC, the dissenters argued that “under
this rulemaking, the Commission will have to allocate its limited resources to
66
inspect more than 1,000 additional advisers.” What’s more, the dissenters said
their concerns were validated when shortly after the rule was enacted, the SEC
began talking about shifting resources from oversight to small advisers in order to
67
conduct the duties created under the new regulation. The dissenters argued that
“this possible shift should have been raised during the open meeting and weighed
68
by the Commission in deciding whether to adopt the rule.”
D. Development of the Law: .Interpretations of the Term “Client” in
Securities Law
Until the SEC adopted its Hedge Fund Rule, the term “client” had been
undefined in both the Investment Advisers Act and the Investment Companies Act.
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed this question in 1985 in Lowe v.
SEC, an appeal of an injunction against publication of an investment newsletter by
a group of former investment advisers whose registrations had been revoked by the

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id. at 72,089-90.
Id. at 72,090.
Id. at 72,089 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 72,089-90.
Id. at 72,090.
Id.
Id.
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69

SEC. The petitioners argued that they should not be prohibited from publishing
their newsletter because in doing so, they were not acting as investment advisers
because they were not offering personalized investment advice but rather only
70
generalized advice.
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Investment Advisers Act was
designed to apply to “those who provide personalized advice attuned to a client’s
71
concerns, whether by written or verbal communication.” Although the court in
Lowe did not specifically offer a definition of the term “client” for the purposes of
the Advisers Act, the holding outlined the requirements for finding the existence of
72
an adviser-client relationship. The court wrote,
the mere fact that a publication contains advice and comment about specific
securities does not give it the personalized character that identifies a professional
investment adviser. Thus, petitioners’ publications do not fit within the central
purpose of the Act because they do not offer individualized advice attuned to any
73
specific portfolio or to any client’s particular needs.

In particular, the court held that an adviser-client relationship requires the
exchange of direct, personalized advice when it found that “fiduciary, person-toperson relationships . . . are characteristic of investment adviser-client
74
relationships.”
Few, if any, other cases have interpreted the particular language at issue in
Goldstein, that is, the meaning of the word “client” under the Investment Advisers
Act. However, there is a rich vein of cases dealing more generally with how to
interpret the meaning of terms in statutes.
The starting point is usually to look to the statute itself for definitions of key
terms. Where the term is not defined, as is the case with the word “client” in the
Investment Advisers Act, courts will first often seek to determine whether the
75
meaning of the term is ambiguous.
However, the absence of a statutory
76
definition does not necessarily render a term ambiguous.
One of the basic rules for determining the meaning of statutory terms is that
the term should be read in the context of the overall statutory scheme, considering
77
the problems Congress sought to solve by enacting the particular law.
Another fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that courts have relied
on says that when Congress uses the same term in various parts of a statute, it
78
usually has the same meaning throughout.

69

Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
Lowe, 472 U.S. at 189.
71
Id. at 208.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 210.
75
15 U.S.C. § 80b (2006).
76
See Alarm Indus. Commc’ns Comm. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
77
See PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Davis v. Michigan Dep't of
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989).
78
See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990); Energy Research Found. v. Defense Nuclear
70
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On top of these basic rules of interpretation, courts will often overlay
consideration of whether a regulatory entity’s interpretation of a statute is
reasonable. Reasonableness usually requires conformity between the meaning of
terms at issue and the purpose of the regulation as well as consistency with
previous interpretations. In Abbott Labs v. Young, the court held that the
“reasonableness of an agency’s construction depends, in part, on the construction’s
79
fit with the statutory language, as well as its conformity to statutory purposes.”
In Northpoint Technology, Ltd. v. FCC, the court held that an interpretation that
represented an unexplained departure from the agency’s prior practice was not a
80
reasonable one.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Outline of the Arguments in Goldstein
Philip Goldstein, an investment adviser and part owner of a hedge fund,
argued that the commission misinterpreted the meaning of client and that its
definition conflicted with other definitions of the term that the SEC itself used in
81
other parts of the same Act.
Goldstein first argued that the term client was unambiguous as it was used in
the section on who qualifies for an exemption to the IAA’s registration
82
requirement.
In the absence of a statutory definition for “client” in the Act itself, Goldstein
83
argued that a natural starting point would be a dictionary definition of the term.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “client” is “a person or entity that employs
84
a professional for advice or help in that professional’s line of work,” a definition
which, Goldstein argued, was not in accord with the Commission’s interpretation
because, in the case of a hedge fund, it is the fund itself that directly employs the
85
adviser, not the investors in the fund.
Goldstein argued that Congress intended the term “client,” as used in the
86
Act, to mean a person who received personalized investment advice. The SEC
was therefore wrong to interpret “client” as including a hedge fund’s investors,
Goldstein argued, because investors do not receive personalized investment advice
87
from the adviser. Specifically, Goldstein highlighted the language of 15 U.S.C. §
80b-2(a)(11) which defines investment advisers as persons who “advise others,

Safety Bd., 917 F.2d 581, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
79
Abbott Labs v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
80
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81
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82
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In Lowe, the Supreme
either directly or through publications and writings.”
Court held that Congress, by using this language, intended that “fiduciary, personto-person relationships” were “characteristic of investment adviser-client
89
relationships.” Goldstein argued that investors who merely bought shares in a
hedge fund do not have the one-on-one, individualized relationship to an adviser
that was necessary for there to have been what the Advisers Act would consider a
90
client relationship.
In addition, Goldstein reasoned that Congress showed a specific intention not
to regulate hedge funds in both the Investment Advisers Act and the Investment
91
Companies Act. Although the Investment Companies Act is a comprehensive set
of laws to regulate the relationship between investment companies, advisers and
the investing public, Congress, in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (c)(7) chose to
specifically exclude private investment entities such as hedge funds, Goldstein
92
argued. What’s more, Congress expanded the kind of companies that would not
be regulated with its later exemption from regulation for entities owned by
93
“qualified purchasers.”
Similarly, by providing an exemption from the registration requirement for
advisers with fewer than fifteen clients while at the same time requiring advisers to
registered investment companies to register under the IAA, Goldstein argued,
94
Congress demonstrated an intention not to regulate hedge fund advisers.
Therefore, “the regulatory framework that Congress designed is thus clearly set out
in the statutes. When a person invests in a private investment entity, there is no
regulation of the investment entity, its adviser or its security holders,” Goldstein
95
contended. To that end, Congress did not require the registration of an adviser to
a private investment entity, such as a hedge fund.
Goldstein also argued that the definition of “client” under the SEC’s new
rule was unreasonable because it was inconsistent with the commission’s past
interpretation of the term and because it created a practical dilemma that Congress
96
could not have intended.
Goldstein asserts that including hedge fund investors as clients of the fund’s
investment adviser would create a practical problem because the interests of the
97
fund itself would often be in conflict with the interest of individual investors.
And an adviser who was expected to maintain a fiduciary duty to both the fund,
98
and its investors, would not be able to reconcile those competing interests. Such a
conflict would create an intractable ethical dilemma for an adviser who found the

88
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90
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95
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15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2006).
Br. for Pet’r at 33, Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873 (2006) (No. 04-1434).
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objectives of individual investors at odds with the objectives of the fund as a
99
whole, Goldstein argued.
B. The SEC’s Argument
The SEC cited three reasons for the need to regulate hedge funds more
closely: the rapid growth of hedge fund assets, even after the failure of LTCM; the
trend toward “retailization” of hedge funds so that ordinary investors were
becoming increasingly exposed to them and; the increase in fraud by hedge
100
funds.
The SEC argued that against this backdrop, and given that the term
“client” is not specifically defined in the IAA statute, it had the authority to extend
101
the definition to cover hedge fund investors.
The SEC pointed out that being exempt from registration meant that hedge
funds, unlike normal mutual funds, did not have to disclose investment positions or
102
their financial condition, either to regulators or even to their own investors.
This allowed hedge funds to implement secretive investment strategies.
The SEC asserted that the IAA itself gave it the authority to make a rule
103
interpreting the scope of the registration exemption.
The Commission relied on
Section 211(a) of the IAA, which states that the SEC can “make, issue, amend, and
rescind such rules . . . as are necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the
functions and powers conferred upon the Commission elsewhere in this
subchapter,” and, in exercising this authority, to “classify persons and matters
within its jurisdiction and prescribe different requirements for different classes of
104
persons or matters.”
The SEC also cited Section 206(4) of the IAA, which gave
it authority to adopt rules that are “reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent,
105
deceptive, or manipulative acts.
The SEC argued further that it had the authority to interpret the IAA because
106
Congress did not specify how clients should be counted.
Nothing in the act
prohibited the SEC from “looking through” an investment fund to count individual
investors for the purposes of the registration exemption, the Commission argued.
And because hedge funds did not exist at the time the act was put in place in 1940,
the commission noted, it is impossible to say now whether Congress envisioned
the fund itself, or the fund’s investors as clients of the adviser for purposes of the
107
registration exemption.
Thus, the Commission submitted, Section 203(b)(3) is
108
ambiguous as to a method for counting clients.
Not only has Congress never resolved this ambiguity, the Commission went

99
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on, but its subsequent amendments suggest that Congress left open the
109
interpretation that hedge fund investors could be counted as clients.
Specifically, the Commission pointed to a 1980 revision to Section 203 (b)(3) that
provided that in the case of a business development company, “no shareholder,
partner, or beneficial owner . . . shall be deemed to be a client of such investment
adviser unless such person is a client of such investment adviser separate and apart
110
from his status as a shareholder, partner or beneficial owner.”
The Commission
argued that such a revision would have been unnecessary had Congress already
intended that shareholders of such companies could not be considered clients of
111
investment advisers.
Even if the specific type of entity at issue in Goldstein was
different from the type of entity that was the subject of the 1980 revision, the fact
that Congress felt compelled to clarify how “clients” should be interpreted there,
112
the SEC argued, indicated that it recognized the term’s ambiguity.
The SEC
then argued that since it established the term as ambiguous, courts should defer to
113
its interpretation of the statute.
The SEC dismissed Goldstein’s argument that its interpretation of “client”
under the Hedge Fund Rule was inconsistent with its interpretation of the term
114
elsewhere in the IAA.
The SEC argued that it interpreted the IAA as allowing it
to “look through” investment funds in certain circumstances to count investors as
115
clients.
In particular the SEC highlighted its 1985 creation of the so-called Safe
Harbor Rule, which allowed advisers to count a legal entity as a single client as
long as his or her investment advice was aimed to satisfy the objectives of the
116
entity and not the objectives of its individual investors.
Although the SEC
ultimately adopted the approach of allowing advisers to count only their funds as
clients, the SEC made of point of noting at the time it implemented this rule that
117
there were, nonetheless, alternative approaches to counting clients.
In addition,
the Commission argued that Congress implicitly acknowledged that the term
118
“client” was ambiguous as used in the advisers act.
The SEC based this
argument on a 1980 revision to separate section of the IAA and the fact that
Congress included language in that revision that said explicitly that investors
119
should not be counted as clients of advisers under that section.
If Congress felt
it was necessary to define how clients should be counted in that section, it must
have been because it felt the term was ambiguous in the act overall, the
120
Commission argued.
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The SEC also countered Goldstein’s contention that Congress intentionally
chose not to regulate hedge funds by creating the private investment company
121
exemption in the Investment Company Act.
Here, the SEC argued that just
because Congress created an exemption from the registration requirement under
the IAA for private investment companies with fewer than one hundred beneficial
owners should not be taken as an indication that Congress also intended to exempt
122
hedge fund advisers under the IAA.
That is, while Goldstein basically argued
the two acts should be considered together as a comprehensive package of
regulation of the investment industry, the SEC countered that the acts are
independent and, thus, an exemption created in one, said nothing about Congress’s
123
intention in the other.
Finally, the SEC argued that Goldstein’s reliance on Lowe v. SEC was
misplaced because that case dealt with different issues and the interpretation of a
124
different section of the Advisers Act.
The SEC argued that Lowe dealt narrowly
with the meaning of the exclusion from the definition of investment adviser in
section 202(a)(11)(D) of the IAA for “the publisher of any bona fide newspaper,
news magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular
125
circulation.”
The SEC argued that the court in Lowe did not interpret the
meaning of the term “client” because that term was not part of the section at issue
126
there. The SEC further argued that the role of publishers was in no way
analogous to hedge fund advisers because while publishers give investment advice
through general circulation publications that investors use to make their own
investment decisions, hedge fund advisers directly manage investments and make
127
all investment decisions.
C. Analysis of the Arguments

1.

The SEC’s Argument

The SEC faced an uphill battle to convince the court that the term “client”
should encompass the shareholders of hedge funds, rather than just the fund entity
itself, because until the SEC promulgated the Hedge Fund Rule, it embraced the
128
latter meaning.
As the Commission itself wrote earlier, when “an adviser to an
investment pool manages the assets of the pool on the basis of the investment
objectives of the participants as a group, it appears appropriate to view the pool –
129
rather than each participant – as a client of the adviser.”
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Nonetheless, the SEC put forth the argument that because the IAA does not
define the term “client,” it is therefore ambiguous as to the method of counting
130
The Commission then relied on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
clients.
Resources Defense Council, to argue that, as the nation’s securities regulator, the
131
SEC should have the authority to interpret the meaning of any ambiguous terms.
The court quickly dismissed this argument, writing simply that:
There is no such rule of law. The lack of a statutory definition of a work does not
necessarily render the meaning of a work ambiguous, just as the presence of a
definition does not necessarily make the meaning clear. A definition only pushes
132
the problem back to the meaning of the defining terms.

The SEC also failed to convince the court that a change in its interpretation
of the meaning of “client” was necessary because of changes in the industry –
specifically the rapid growth of hedge funds, increasing retailization and a
133
corresponding increase in fraud.
The court seemed unconvinced of significant
change, and thus was unconvinced a new interpretation was appropriate.
The court held that:
[t]he Hedge Fund Rule might be more understandable if, over the years, the
advisery relationship between hedge fund advisers and investors had changed . . .
but without any evidence that the role of fund advisers with respect to investors had
undergone a transformation, there is a disconnect between the factors the
134
Commission cited and the rule it promulgated.”
In the absence of a compelling
change in the “nature of investment adviser-client relationships,” the court says the
135
SEC’s choice of definition “appears completely arbitrary.

It seems the court was probably correct to be skeptical of the SEC claims of
dramatic changes in the industry. After the ruling was handed down, SEC
chairman Christopher Cox conceded in testimony to Congress that there was, in
136
fact, little indication that the feared “retailization” of hedge funds had occurred.
The SEC also failed to make a convincing argument for why the court should
137
ignore traditional statutory construction. . The court seemed wholly unmoved by
the SEC’s argument that the Hedge Fund Rule amended only the method for

130
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counting clients and did not alter the obligations owed by an investment adviser to
its clients, holding that “we ordinarily presume that the same words used in
138
different parts of a statute have the same meaning.”
The SEC opened itself up to contradiction by promulgating the Safe Harbor
Rule, while the language of that revision, theoretically, left open the possibility of
counting investors as clients, the SEC in fact, chose to do just the opposite and
139
leave investors out of the definition of “clients.”
That decision only seems to
support the idea that, for the sake of consistency, the term client elsewhere in the
act should also not be extended to include investors.
The holding also emphasized the lack of a clear settled definition of hedge
140
fund, saying that “hedge funds” are notoriously difficult to define.
The term
appears nowhere in federal securities laws, and even industry participants do not
141
agree upon a single definition.”
Although the court never explicitedly stated
why this is a problem, surely, the fact that the SEC, in the court’s view, never
clearly defines a hedge fund contributed to the sense that the new rule was
142
arbitrary.
2.

Goldstein’s Argument

In short, the case was not so much won by Goldstein as it was lost by the
SEC. Goldstein relied to a large extent on the argument that the Supreme Court’s
Lowe decision applied here. The SEC made a strong argument that Lowe could be
distinguished because its holding was limited to the issue of when a publisher is
143
considered an investment adviser.
The Lowe ruling quite likely would not have been an impenetrable barrier
had the SEC presented a stronger case for why it should be allowed to change its
interpretation of “client.” The court said as much when it wrote “because [the
Lowe court] was construing an exception to the definition of “investment adviser,”
we do not read too much into the Court’s understanding of the meaning of
144
‘client’.”
The court pointed out that the main thrust of Goldstein’s argument was
145
The court is
simply that the commission misinterpreted the Advisers Act.
ultimately convinced, as Goldstein argued, that “Congress did not intend
‘shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries’ of a hedge fund to be
146
counted as ‘clients.’”
Goldstein made this argument largely by appealing to the court’s common
sense. In fact, the court went on to articulate what seemed to a common-sense
138
139
140
141
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143
144
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146
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interpretation of what Congress must have meant by the term “client” in the act
when it writes:
an investor in a private fund may benefit from the adviser’s advice (or he may
suffer from it) but he does not receive the advice directly. He invests a portion of
his assets in the fund. The fund manager – the adviser – controls the disposition of
the pool of capital in the fund. The adviser does not tell the investor how to spend
his money; the investor made that decision when he invested in the fund. Having
bought into the fund, the investor fades into the background; his role is completely
passive. If the person or entity controlling the fund is not an ‘investment adviser’
to each individual investor, then a fortiori each investor cannot be a ‘client’ of that
147
person or entity. These are just two sides of the same coin.

Goldstein made another kind of appeal to common-sense when he argued
that surely Congress could not have intended to create the conflict that naturally
would arise if an adviser were deemed to have a fiduciary duty to both his fund and
148
to the investors in that fund.
Such a conflict, Goldstein argued, would surely
result if the SEC interpreted the term client to encompass fund investors. The
court again seemed to latch on to this argument when it wrote
if the investors are owed a fiduciary duty and the entity is also owed a fiduciary
duty, then the adviser will inevitably face conflicts of interest. Consider an
investment adviser to a hedge fund that is about to go bankrupt. His advice to the
fund will likely include any and all measures to remain solvent. His advice to an
investor in the fund , however, would likely be to sell. For the same reason, we do
not ordinarily deem the shareholders in a corporation the ‘clients’ of the
149
corporations lawyers or accountants.

3.

Impact of the Decision

Although, under Chairman Christopher Cox, the SEC decided not to appeal
the Goldstein decision, that does not mean the SEC has given up the battle to
tighten regulation of hedge funds. Shortly after the ruling was announced,
Chairman Cox announced two new proposed changes to the IAA designed to
150
protect hedge fund investors.
First, the Commissioner said the SEC intended to
raise the minimum amount of assets an individual investor would be required to
151
have to invest in hedge funds.
The SEC would raise the minimum amount to
qualify as a so-called accredited investor under Regulation D from one million to
152
2.5 million in assets..
The SEC based its recommendation on research that showed that many more
U.S. households are eligible to invest in unregistered investment funds today than
147
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were eligible at the time these rules were put in place more than two decades ago.
The research found that some 8.47 percent of U.S. households qualified to invest in
hedge funds under the current definition of accredited investor, compared to 1.87%
153
at the time the rule was introduced in 1982.
Raising the minimum-asset number
to $2.5 million would reduce the percentage of households eligible to invest to just
1.3 percent, just below the percentage of households that qualified under the
154
current rule when it was first established.
Second, the SEC has proposed a tougher anti-fraud statute aimed at hedge
155
fund advisers, whether they are registered or not.
The SEC seems to believe
stronger anti-fraud language will allow it to force advisers to “look through” their
funds and count investors as clients—essentially the same thing it tried to do with
156
the Hedge Fund Rule.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The first problem the SEC should address, before imposing tougher
regulations on hedge funds, is to define exactly what kind of entities it has in mind.
As the Goldstein court correctly pointed out, there is no consensus on the meaning
157
of the term hedge fund.
And unless the SEC establishes clearly what it means
by the term, any attempt to increase regulation is bound to suffer from the same
problems identified by the Goldstein court; that is, that any increased regulation
158
targeting hedge funds is arbitrary.
However, any serious consideration of a definition that includes the
companies the SEC is concerned about will inevitably not result in any expansion
of regulation.
It is generally accepted that the term hedge fund dates from the 1940s and
originally referred to investment companies that tried to reduce normal market risk
159
by “hedging” long stock positions by selling some stocks short.
However, the
term is now used in the financial press to refer to any investment company that is
160
not registered with the SEC. Indexes of hedge funds include everything from
companies that invest in risky distressed securities to those that maintain marketneutral positions, so that the term clearly encompasses a wide-range of investment
161
strategies and degrees of risk.
Since the SEC seems most concerned with keeping small investors from
becoming exposed to highly-risky hedge funds, an appropriate definition would be

153
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one that encompasses unregistered funds that target retail investors with highly162
However, if it were to define hedge
leveraged, or otherwise risky, investments.
funds in such a way, no new firms would be subject to registration, which are not
already required to register. The investment company rule, discussed above, which
requires registration of any company offering investments to the public already
163
forces firms targeting retail investors to register.
Moreover, such a definition is
not likely to increase protections for small investors who might become indirectly
exposed to hedge funds through their pension funds. Pension fund managers are
already required to register and are already regulated by the commission so any
164
further protection for investors in this regard would only be redundant.
On the other hand, the SEC’s proposal to raise the minimum amount of
assets needed to be an accredited investor is something the SEC can and probably
165
should do.
$1 million is just not what it used to be, particularly given the rapid
appreciation in real estate prices over the last decade. In Southern California the
price of an average home has more than doubled since 1998 and prices of fairly
166
modest homes in nice neighborhoods easily top $1 million.
How unusual, then,
would it be for a couple nearing retirement to have $500,000 of equity in their
167
home and another $500,000 in retirement savings.
And so it’s not very difficult
to envision that a large number of families who might soon qualify as accredited,
even if they are not necessarily sophisticated investors.
The SEC proposal to lift the minimum asset requirement to $2.5 million
would reduce the percentage of households that qualify to very near the level it
was when the regulation was first implemented, and the additional proposal to
adjust the number every five years for inflation would insure that the exemption
would continue to include only the richest investors who are least likely to need
168
safeguards.
However, it is not clear that the SEC has fully considered other options that
may achieve the same goal in a more effective way. Since the main reason that so
many more households now qualify as accredited investors was the run-up in real
estate prices, another, relatively simple solution would seem to be to exclude the
value of one’s primary residence as an asset for the purpose of qualifying. Such a
change would eliminate the scenario the SEC seems most concerned with—the
household of otherwise modest means, which qualifies to invest in hedge funds
simply by virtue of the fact that the value of their home, a property they may have
purchases decades ago, has suddenly soared.
The idea underlying the exemption is that millionaires are normally
162
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sufficiently sophisticated in financial affairs to watch out for themselves and even
169
if they fail to do so, they can afford to suffer some losses.
However, a couple
who has $1 million only because the equity in their home has shot up in the last ten
years, may not be able to afford much of a loss before they find themselves on the
street. Excluding the value of their home, would keep potentially vulnerable
investors away from hedge funds.
Commissioner Cox told the senate banking committee last year that he was
“concerned that the current definition, which is decades old, is not only out of date,
but wholly inadequate to protect unsophisticated investors from the complex risks
170
of investment in most hedge funds.”
However, a definition of accredited
investor that eliminated the value of one’s primary residence would go a long way
toward removing unsophisticated investors from the pool of those eligible to invest
in hedge funds.
The SEC has expressed concern that ordinary investors may become exposed
171
to hedge funds through pension funds.
However, this problem too seems more
speculative than real. Even if pension funds were aggressively moving into hedge
172
funds, which they are not, there is no reason to believe the current regulatory
framework would be unable to deal with such a trend. Largely, there is not a
problem when ordinary investors are exposed to hedge funds only indirectly
through their pension plans because those pension fund managers are required to
register and any additional regulation of hedge funds would be duplicative and a
173
waste of SEC resources. Small investors and pensioners are protected by the
long-recognized duty of managers of pension funds not to expose their fund’s
174
beneficiaries to excessive risks.
The SEC’s proposal to institute tougher anti-fraud measures also seems
175
While such a change does seem to have a greater chance of
misguided.
withstanding judicial scrutiny, there is, again, little evidence that it is needed. The
176
SEC already has tough anti-fraud tools and is using them.
What’s more, while
the SEC may have limited tools to regulate hedge funds directly it already
maintains close oversight over counterparties to hedge funds, through which it
177
should be able to identify any systemic problems.
The commissioners who dissented to the hedge fund rule raised a similar
argument, relying on no less an authority than the former Federal Reserve Board
chairman, Alan Greenspan, who stated that:
169
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If there [was] a public policy reason to monitor hedge fund activity, the best
method of doing so without raising liquidity concerns would be indirectly through
oversight of those broker-dealers (so-called prime brokers) that clear, settle, and
finance trades for hedge funds. Although the use of multiple prime brokers by the
largest funds would complicate the monitoring of individual funds by this method,
such monitoring could provide much useful information on the hedge funds sector
178
as a whole.

Although the SEC says it is worried about retailization of hedge funds,
179
The SEC
there’s no evidence, beyond the anecdotal, that this is happening.
chairman himself conceded that the retailization of hedge funds is, so far, just a
theoretical problem when he told the Senate banking committee last year “[w]hile
some refer to an alleged growing trend toward the ‘retailization’ of hedge funds,
the Commission’s staff are not aware of significant numbers of truly retail
investors investing directly in hedge funds. In my view, such a development, were
180
it to occur, should be viewed with alarm.”
And while small investors are clearly not buying into hedge funds directly,
there is also little indication that they have become indirectly exposed through their
pension funds or mutual funds as public and private pension funds have so far not
181
invested heavily in hedge funds.
Citing a study by Greenwich Associates, the SEC conceded that 80% of
public pension funds, and 82% of corporate funds, had made little or no investment
182
in hedge funds as of last year.
The cited report also stated that that those
corporate and public pension funds that did invest in hedge funds allocated an
183
average of only about 5% of their assets to them.
Such numbers indicate that
even the indirect exposure of most small investors to hedge funds is small to nonexistent.
The SEC expressed greater concern about increasing exposure of
184
endowments to hedge fund, but here too the numbers are far from alarming.
The report found that about one-third of endowments did not invest in hedge
185
funds.
The nearly two-thirds that did invest in hedge funds, allocated an
186
average of 18% of their assets to them.
While this number clearly shows greater
exposure to hedge funds by endowments, there is also very little reason to be
concerned by it because the financial fate of endowments will rarely have any
178
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impact on small, unsophisticated investors.
Before imposing stringent registration requirements on pension funds, the
SEC should consider whether there is not a middle ground approach under which it
could get more information about the size and growth of funds, while at the same
time allowing hedge funds to keep their trading strategies secret.
Many hedge funds argue that revealing information about investment
strategies and techniques would violate their intellectual property rights and put
187
them at a disadvantage.
One compromise that has been suggested during 2004
Senate hearings on hedge funds was to allow hedge funds to remain exempt from
audits so that they could keep trading strategies confidential, in exchange for funds
agreeing to give the SEC any information it needed to track the size and general
188
direction of hedge fund activity.
This is a common-sense solution that would
allow hedge funds to maintain their trade secrets while at the same time giving the
SEC most of what it seeks.
In short, the SEC’s hedge fund rule was a fix for a system that is not broken.
The alleged retailization of hedge funds and the rampant fraud that the SEC
189
claimed as the basis for the rule, have not transpired.
And in many ways, the
common notion that hedge funds are unregulated is also largely a myth.
The fact that hedge fund companies and advisers are exempt from the
registration requirements does not mean that they are free to do whatever the
please. As SEC Commissioner Cox himself pointed out following the ruling,
notwithstanding the Goldstein decision, hedge funds today remain subject to SEC
regulations and enforcement under the antifraud, civil liability, and other provisions
of the federal securities laws. We will continue to vigorously enforce the federal
securities laws against hedge funds and hedge fund advisers who violate those laws.
190
Hedge funds are not, should not be, and will not be unregulated.

And so, ultimately, the Goldstein decision may represent a victory of the
common-sense notion of, don’t fix it if it isn’t broken.
A. Recent Developments
At the time of this writing, Congress was continuing to hold hearings about
hedge funds and whether they should be subjected to more stringent regulation. In
early March 2007, Senator Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, tried to slip
an amendment requiring registration for hedge funds into a Homeland Security
191
bill, but the idea was rejected before coming up for a vote.
The failure of that bill was part of what appears to be waning enthusiasm for
more stringent regulations of hedge funds as the warnings about the risks of
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ordinary pensioners losing their life savings to savage hedge funds grow noticeably
192
A month before Sen. Grassley’s amendment died on the vine, a key
less dire.
advisery group recommended against implementing measures to strengthen
193
regulation of hedge funds.
In what The Wall Street Journal dubbed a welcome call to inaction, the
President’s Working Group, made up of the heads of the SEC, the Federal Reserve,
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Treasury, concluded that any
systemic risk from hedge funds could be best addressed by continuing to closely
194
monitor their counterparties, including banks and brokerages.
The long-awaited
report also said the SEC’s move to raise minimum asset requirements for hedge
195
fund investors would work well to protect unsophisticated investors.
Calls for
increased regulation of hedge funds have waned amid a widespread concern that
U.S. capital markets are losing their competitive edge over other money centers
such as London, Hong Kong and Shanghai due, at least in part, to excessive
196
regulation.
Perhaps another reason the drive to impose tougher regulations on hedge
funds is losing steam is that many of the funds themselves are not the high-fliers
they once were. Last year, the average hedge fund generated a return of just
12.9%, lower than the market as a whole, according to Hedge Fund Research
197
Inc.
Such earthly returns probably raise fewer alarm bells for those worried
about what kind of investments hedge funds are making.
This is not to say that voices calling for tougher regulation have been
completely drowned out. While anti-regulation sentiment seems to be on the rise
in the United States, that is not necessarily true elsewhere. Finance Minister Peer
Steinbrück of Germany, which currently holds the presidency of the Group of
Seven industrialized nations, has been a vocal critic of weak hedge fund regulation
198
and has urged the Group of Seven to take up the issue.
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